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Liberal Constitutionalism and the 
Unsettling of the Secular 
 






 Our constitutional theories are constructed on a foundation of prior 
claims about the character of the social world. These foundational social 
understandings lend support and offer resources to the constitutional 
ideas and practices that they undergird. Indeed, they serve as the implicit 
conditions of plausibility for the accounts that we give about the nature 
and operation of constitutionalism and what we ask constitutional law to 
achieve. When elements of that substructure of assumptions or claims 
about the social world are unsettled or disrupted, gaps, cracks, and frailties 
in the constitutional superstructure are exposed. This relationship can be 
examined from either direction. Becoming alive to inconsistencies, trouble 
spots, or new perplexities in constitutional practice and theory, we might 
be moved to ask what has changed about the social facts – or our 
awareness of them – that otherwise lend coherence and stability to those 
theories and practices. Or seized with new or different understandings of, 
or newly aware of different facts about, the social world, we might wonder 
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what impact this has on the stability and coherence of our approach to 
constitutional law. 
And so, for example, a prior assumption about relative income 
equality or economic opportunity makes more plausible a certain set of 
claims about the role and nature of constitutional law. A more traditionally 
liberal approach to constitutions and constitutional rights sits more or less 
comfortably on that foundation, and a neo-liberal constitutionalism might 
thrive on it, approaching constitutionalism as a regulatory device in 
service of a promising free market.1 Our attention turned to homelessness, 
poverty, and radical income inequality, gaps open up in those accounts 
and practices. The absence of social and economic rights in a constitutional 
order now appears as a fundamental gap, not merely a question of 
institutional competence and a requirement for state action,2 and we will 
be more inclined to think about liberal constitutions as devices of wealth 
and property protection. 
In this chapter, I suggest that certain features of our constitutional 
theories and practices have been more dependent than we have heretofore 
acknowledged on an implicit faith in the character and success of 
secularism. In particular, I have in mind what we might call a ‘folk’3 
understanding of secularism: one that imagines a more or less workable 
divide between religion and law/politics and that maps something like a 
general reduction in the public salience of religious belief, belonging, and 
practice. Reflection on modern constitutional practice has proceeded 
rather comfortably on an imaginative foundation in which some such 
understanding of secularism has been part of the furniture of the modern 
political and social order. In this respect, liberal constitutional theory has 
                                                 
1 See Bernard E Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural 
Order (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011).  
2 See Gavin W Anderson, ‘Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism’ (2004) 
17 CJLJ 31. 
3 I am drawing inspiration here from Sally Falk Moore’s classic description of a ‘folk’ 
understanding of law as a procedural tool at the disposal of states to achieve functional ends. 
Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978). 
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simply participated in the common sense of most modern social and 
political reflection, in which  
[t]he separation of the state and of its various institutions, 
including law, from religion, and with this the religious 
neutrality of the state (and the political neutering of religion), 
has been conceived as not only central to the emergence of 
this new order, but also necessary for its preservation and for 
the achievement of the justice that it is supposed to 
guarantee.4 
This underlying assumption about the secular character of the social world 
has lent certain resources to liberal constitutional theory and made 
possible particular ideas about the nature of our constitutional lives, laws, 
and practices.  
And yet the character – indeed, the existence – of this secularism 
has come into question. The conviction that our political and social lives 
can be satisfyingly described by that ‘folk’ account of secularism has been 
seriously destabilized by experience and theory alike. It turns out that the 
facts surrounding our social lives elude and exceed the containers relied 
upon by this understanding of secularism, and scholars have shown that 
secularism is a much more complex, untidy, and inconvenient concept. 
The best understanding of secularism is a matter of significant debate; that 
we are now denied a simple or stable concept of secularism on which to 
lean is not.  
The question at the heart of this chapter is the following: What 
happens when we fold this emergent awareness of the instability of 
secularism back into accounts of the character of constitutions, their 
legitimacy, and the nature of constitutional adjudication?5 In essence, I am 
                                                 
4 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, ‘Introduction’ in 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo (eds), After Secular Law 
(Stanford, Stanford Law Books, 2011) 1. 
5 Recent scholarship has generated a more complicated relationship between religion and law, 
showing ways in which the religious and the legal are far messier and less distinct. See eg 
Sullivan et al., After Secular Law. For example, the political theology literature has troubled the 
relationship between religion and the rule of law, writ large, as have historical accounts of the 
emergence of modern law. See, eg, Paul W Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011); James Q Whitman, The 
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asking whether the success of central aspects of contemporary 
constitutional theory and practice is tethered to the fate of a certain 
understanding of the secular. The stresses of religious difference that have 
disturbed confidence in sociological and political claims about the 
character and demands of secularism may lead us to question our comfort 
with the orthodoxies – and unsettle certain idées fixes – of contemporary 
liberal constitutionalism. Faith in the secular character of the social world 
– understood in a particular way – has afforded certain analytical 
resources for constitutional law and possibilities for how we might 
understand contemporary constitutionalism. Denied those possibilities 
and resources, we see certain gaps or shortcomings in prevailing accounts 
of liberal constitutionalism. In particular, and drawing heavily from the 
Canadian example, this chapter explores the way in which the facts 
associated with this unsettling of secularism trouble theories that position 
proportionality as the central feature of modern constitutional life, 
challenge the centrality of rights constitutionalism in constitutional 
thought and practice, and ultimately raise questions about the ground for 
constitutional authority and legitimacy, pointing to the abiding salience of 
claims about sovereignty in modern constitutionalism. Put under pressure 
by the social facts surrounding religion and politics, as this part of the 
foundation unsteadies and begins to shake, vulnerabilities and 
deficiencies in our constitutional theory are revealed. 
To be clear, the claim is not that the social facts surrounding 
religion, law, and politics are responsible for generating or producing 
those faults or shortcomings, as though but for an instability in secularism, 
the edifice would be solid and sound. Rather, these faults are latent in the 
architecture (in the assumptions and ideology) of liberal constitutional 
theory and practice, and are simply exposed by tracing the effects of a 
disruption in the secular. As I alluded to at the outset of this chapter, other 
shifts in our understanding of the social world are eminently capable of 
doing similar diagnostic work. But it is true that religion seems 
particularly adept at, if not uniquely able to, trouble the conceits of liberal 
                                                 
Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2008). 
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constitutionalism. It is, therefore, to the unsettling of the ‘folk’ idea of 
secularism that I now turn. 
 
THE UNSETTLING OF SECULARISM 
 
 Over the past many years, the concept of the secular has been under 
siege by social and political theorists and philosophers who have contested 
its meaning, history, and character, exploring both the range of social and 
political phenomena that ‘secularism’ can describe, and the political ends 
that it can serve. José Casanova, for example, famously distinguished 
between secularism as a claim about the overall reduction in religious 
adherence in society and secularism as designating a privatization of 
religion.6 Years later, in his conceptual history of the secular, A Secular Age, 
Charles Taylor added a third way of understanding secularism to this 
definitional mix. Secularism, for Taylor, centrally describes an imaginative 
shift in which religion and a religious life slowly became but one option 
among others for a life of human flourishing– his so-called ‘secularism 3’.7  
These kinds of definitional debates have been accompanied by a 
growing awareness of the diverse range of political configurations that can 
subsist under the capacious umbrella of the term ‘secularism’. The 
contrasting archetypes of French laïcité and American free exercise or 
Anglo-multiculturalism (themselves misleading as to the forms of 
religious and political life lived in those countries) 8  have featured 
prominently in commentary about the nature and demands of the secular. 
In a pivotal moment in debates about the management of religious 
diversity in Canada, Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor labelled these 
                                                 
6 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1994). 
7 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 2007). 
8 John R Bowen, Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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competing models ‘closed’ and ‘open’ secularism,9 whereas Tariq Modood 
prefers to describe these main historical strands as ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ 
secularism.10 
Yet the pluralization of secularism goes well beyond two archetypal 
models. Scholars point to the diverse and varied local practices and 
settlements collected within these two broad categories, as well as wholly 
different ways of structuring the relationship between state power and 
religion, leaving us with ‘varieties of secularisms’, rather than a single 
concept of the secular.11 The variety of forms of the secular, and the various 
relationships between religion and state institutions that the concept 
seems to embrace, is such that it seems dangerous to claim that 
‘secularism’ demands much of anything in particular.12 
And so a deep indeterminacy has settled in around the concept of 
the secular, to the extent that it seeks to offer or describe a specific 
regulatory ideal for how to keep the state and its authority and institutions 
separate from religion. Indeed, if it points to something, it may be that 
‘secularism’ marks the involvement of the state in matters of religion, not 
their insulation from one another. This is Talal Asad’s claim, pointing as 
he does to the way in which secularism bears the imprint of its historical 
formation in contact with Christianity and is still, in fact, defined by its 
                                                 
9 Quebec, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accomodement reliées aux différences 
culturelles, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, by Gérard Bouchard and Charles 
Taylor (Quebec City, Gouvernement du Québec, 2008). 
10 Tariq Modood, ‘Is There a Crisis of Secularism in Western Europe?’ (2012) 73 Sociology of 
Religion 130. 
11 Janet R Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (eds), Secularisms (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 
2008). Rajeev Bhargava points to India as a source for a model of secularism built on ideas of 
‘principled distance’ and ‘contextual secularism’: ‘States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of 
Secularism’ (2010) 10 The Hedgehog Review 8. 
12 I discuss this problem of being caught between the particular and the universal in claims about 
the character of the secular in Benjamin L Berger, ‘Belonging to Law: Religious Difference, 
Secularism, and the Conditions of Civic Inclusion’ (2015) 24 Social & Legal Studies 47. More 
generally, I discuss the risks – both conceptual and material – inherent in the legal use of the 
concept of the secular in Benjamin L Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the 
Claims of Constitutionalism (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2015). 
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relationship with and involvement in religion. 13  And it is Agrama’s 
essential claim when he explains that ‘[i]t is secularism itself that 
incessantly blurs together religion and politics in Egypt’.14 Secularism, for 
Agrama, is not a determinate concept or institutional configuration but, 
rather, a ‘problem-space’ that draws the state into asking and seeking to 
answer questions about religion. Marching under the banner of 
‘secularism’, state institutions must ask and answer questions about the 
nature and definition of religion, about the meaning of religious symbols 
and practices, and about the location of the boundary between religion and 
state. ‘Thus’, he explains, ‘what best characterizes secularism is not a 
separation between religion and politics, but an ongoing, deepening 
entanglement in the question of religion and politics, for the purpose of 
identifying and securing fundamental liberal rights and freedoms’.15  
Meanwhile, alongside this growing conceptual instability around 
the idea of the secular, we have watched as social facts have belied the folk 
conception of what modern secularity entails. Religion is simply more 
muscularly present, more persistently assertive, in ‘secular’ states than this 
understanding allows or than the so-called ‘secularization thesis’ – the idea 
that, within modernity, religion and religiosity would experience steady 
decline – predicted. There has been a kind of renewed awareness – or 
rediscovery – of the public salience of religion. Bhargava argues that, in 
this sense, secularism is a concept very much under strain. He goes so far 
as to describe this as a perceived ‘crisis’ of secularism and explains that, to 
a considerable extent, the pressure exerted on the descriptive account of 
an increasingly non-religious political world is a result of migration and 
the growing presence of Muslims in Europe. As Bhargava explains, ‘the 
crisis of secular states in Europe is due, in part, because the secular 
humanist ethos endorsed by many citizens is not fully shared, particularly 
                                                 
13 See eg Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003); Talal Asad, ‘French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair”’ 
(2003) 8 The Hedgehog Review 93. 
14 Hussein Ali Agrama, ‘Sovereign Power and Secular Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a 
Religious State?’ in Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo (eds), 
After Secular Law (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) ch 9, 184. 
15 Ibid, 186. 
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by those who have newly acquired citizenship’.16 Though he is writing of 
Europe, similar trends are evident in North America and elsewhere in the 
world. 17  Bhargava sums up the character and source of this ‘crisis of 
secularism’ as the ‘new reality of the vibrant presence of multiple religions 
in public life and the accompanying social tensions’.18 
Modood argues that to claim that there is a ‘crisis of secularism’ in 
Europe ‘is not only exaggerated but misleading’.19 For him, ‘[t]he ‘crisis of 
secularism’ is really the challenge of multiculturalism’. 20  And yet he 
nevertheless agrees that ‘[p]olitical secularism has been destabilized, in 
particular the historical flow from a moderate to radical secularism and 
the expectation of its continuation has been jolted’.21  Modood explains 
that, with the demographic and social changes associated with deeper 
religious diversity, ‘it slowly becomes apparent that the secularist status 
quo, with certain residual privileges for Christians, is untenable as it 
stands’.22  
But of course, the energetic persistence of religion in public life is 
far from exclusively a matter of increased religious difference born of 
demographic change, immigration, or the political presence of Islam. 
Canvassing the case law and scholarship around the world, one sees that 
the disruption of the expected historical flow toward the more thorough 
separation of religion and public life that Modood describes – what he calls 
the destabilization of political secularism – is also a product of assertive 
expressions of Christianity in political policies, social life, and legal 
debates. 23  This, too, is a significant source of the ‘vibrant presence of 
                                                 
16 Bhargava, ‘Crisis of Secularism’, 11. 
17 Anuradha Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (eds), The Crisis of Secularism in 
India (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2007). 
18 Bhargava, ‘Crisis of Secularism’, 12. 
19 Modood, ‘Western Europe’, 146. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, 145. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See, eg, Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free 
Enterprise (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2009); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, 
Prison Religion: Faith-Based Reform and the Constitution (Princeton, Princeton University 
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multiple religions in public life and the accompanying social tensions’.24 
In short, as we look around our social world, the folk account of 
‘secularism’ seems simply not to describe what we see. Religion has not 
retreated into the private realm, withdrawing from the domain of politics 
and law, nor does it appear to be poised to do so. 
Tested, questioned, and challenged by these historical, 
philosophical, and sociological observations, an understanding of the 
modern state as ‘secular’ has been seriously unsettled. It fails to 
satisfyingly capture what we see happening in our social and political 
lives, and, with its range of meanings and encoded partiality, no longer 
seems to offer itself as a response to or a tool for managing religious 
difference. Reveries of secularism seem to have been disturbed by 
inconvenient social and historical facts. And as the concept of secularism 
has become descriptively and normatively unstable, new questions are 
raised as to the character of the modern state that it sought to describe. 
Some have responded by describing the condition in contemporary 
western societies as, instead, ‘post-secular’.25 Although this moniker has 
itself attracted a range of meanings and definitions, 26  the term draws 
attention to the untidiness and complexity of the role of religion in modern 
society, ‘[highlighting] the active, even robust, presence of religion … or, 
at the very least, the recognition of religious ideas as normatively 
“legitimate” and persuasive to many’,27  as well as the deep normative 
diversity (referred to as the ‘fragmentation of meaning’ by some)28 that 
defines the contemporary condition.  
                                                 
Press, 2009); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of 
Religion (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015). 
24 Bhargava, ‘Crisis of Secularism’, 12. 
25 See, eg, Jürgen Habermas, ‘Notes on Post-Secular Society’ (2008) 25 New Perspectives 
Quarterly 17. Arif Jamal offers a helpful and compendious description of the ideas that have 
collected around the term ‘post-secular’ in his ‘Considering Freedom of Religion in a Post-
Secular Context: Hapless or Hopeful?’ (2017) 6 Oxford J of Law & Religion 433. 
26 James Beckford, ‘SSSR Presidential Address – Public Religions and the Post-secular: Critical 
Reflections’ (2012) 51 J for the Scientific Study of Religion 1. 
27 Jamal, ‘Considering Freedom of Religion’, 436.  
28 See Zachary R Calo, ‘Religion, Human Rights, and Post-Secular Legal Theory’ (2011) 85 St 
John’s L Rev 495; Jamal, ‘Considering Freedom of Religion’, 436–7. 
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This brings us to the question at the heart of this piece: how might 
this unsettling of secularism trouble contemporary constitutional theory 
and practice? What gaps, cracks, or shortcomings in prevailing accounts 
of liberal constitutionalism appear when they are denied the support of 
the stabilizing ideas associated with secularism? 
 
CONSEQUENCES FOR LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
 
 A more or less stable, confident claim about secularism – 
understood as the separation of religion from politics, law, and state 
institutions – offers certain resources to constitutional theory and practice. 
It puts pieces in play to be relied upon when developing our 
understandings of constitutional law and practice. There is, for example, a 
vision of the good citizen implied by concepts of the secular: someone who 
can understand religion as a discrete and therefore manageable 
component of their lives; someone thereby fitted to a sense of the social 
and political in which the private/public divide is an organizing principle; 
someone whose interests and concerns are largely immanent. Similarly, as 
I will explore below, the ability to invoke a claim about the secular 
provides access to a form of normative authority that is based on the 
adequacy of reasons and the success of the state’s reason-giving – an 
understanding of legitimacy grounded on consensus and convergence, 
and one that does not depend on resort to larger metaphysical or 
ontological claims. These are but examples of the kinds of imaginative 
resources that constitutional law gains by having a claim about secularism 
that is felt to faithfully map the social world over which law presides. But 
as secularism becomes unstable, these pieces are pulled away. We begin to 
see that elements of the liberal constitutional common sense are 
themselves unsteady. And what ensues is an awareness of the inadequacy 
of central aspects of orthodox accounts of the character of modern liberal 
constitutionalism. 
In what follows, I take up certain of those core elements and, 
drawing heavily from the Canadian example, explore the way in which 
they are disrupted by a social world that resists the claims of secularism, 
ultimately arriving at an examination of the challenges posed for how we 
understand the sources of constitutional legitimacy and authority. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269536 
 
 
Forthcoming in Rex Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton, 
Mass: Edward Elgar, 2018) (Pre-publication Version) 
 11 
Proportionality as the ‘Ultimate Rule of Law’ and the Key Task of ‘the Judge in a 
Democracy’ 
 
 The ascendancy of proportionality as the defining characteristic of 
modern liberal constitutionalism is a well-observed phenomenon. 29 
Proportionality is the elephant in the comparative constitutionalist’s room. 
Despite persistent divergence in varieties of substantive constitutional 
particulars, the idea that the essence of modern constitutionalism both can 
and should be found in the logic of proportionality is a prized orthodoxy. 
Proportionality has settled into the heart of Canadian constitutional life, 
becoming central to how the just constitutional state is imagined. Gaining 
an early foothold in the means-ends balancing test involved in the 
justificatory clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1,30 
the ethic or logic of proportionality has metastasized through its 
absorption into administrative law, now measuring the justice of all state 
decision-making.31 But the Canadian iteration of proportionality is hardly 
distinctive; it is an echo of the necessity and suitability conditions found in 
the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, has drawn 
inspiration from Israeli understandings and experience of proportionality 
                                                 
29 See Paul W Kahn, ‘Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key’ (2003) 101 Michigan L Rev 
2677; Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72; Grégoire CN Webber, ‘Proportionality, 
Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 CJLJ 179; Benjamin L 
Berger, ‘The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the Modern 
Constitutional Imagination’ (2011) 61 U Toronto LJ 579; Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: 
The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). 
30 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  This proportionality test, governing the analysis of s 
1, was established in R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
31 Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12. This expansion in the role of proportionality is an 
interesting dramatization of Alexy’s theory of horizontal effect (Robert Alexy, A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights (transl Julian Rivers; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 352ff), 
whereby, as Kumm puts it, ‘[c]onstitutional rights norms ‘radiate’ into all areas of the legal 
system … so as to affect the rights and duties of all actors within the jurisdiction’ (Mattias 
Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional 
Justice’ (2003) 2 ICON 574, 585.)  
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review,32 and is reflective of a global common sense about the essential 
character of constitutionalism.33 Proportionality has been described both 
as the central practice of constitutional adjudication (the key task of ‘the 
judge in a democracy’34) and the governing measure of constitutional 
justice, or the ‘ultimate rule of law’.35  
 If one looks under the hood of proportionality, one sees that it ‘is 
nothing more than the contemporary expression of reasonableness’.36 As 
an account of modern constitutionalism, it rests on a particular way of 
imagining the relationship between reason and state justice. Paul Kahn 
makes this point when he describes the genealogy of proportionality 
review, which, he claims, ‘lies in the belief that the rule of law is the 
internalization of reason itself as a regulative ideal within the political 
order’.37 That which is constitutional is that which is reasonable, all things 
considered. For those who advance this account of the character of 
constitutionalism, it is a means of imagining constitutional judgment that 
‘permits disputes about the limits of legitimate lawmaking to be settled on 
the basis of reason and rational argument’.38 As one scholar describes it, 
this means that proportionality can ‘claim an objectivity and integrity no 
                                                 
32 In Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, the Supreme Court of Canada 
cited and drew from Aharon Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 U 
Toronto LJ 369. 
33 See Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity, 215-6. 
34 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
35 David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). There is 
a rich literature debating the merits, and offering various models, of proportionality review. The 
purpose of the present discussion is not to rehearse and explore those extensive debates. For an 
excellent review of these debates, and for a sophisticated conception of the ‘moral structure of 
proportionality’, see Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity, 215–271. For criticisms of proportionality 
review see eg Grégoire CN Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); Webber, ‘Cult of Constitutional Rights 
Scholarship’; Francisco J Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
36 Kahn, ‘Comparative Constitutionalism’, 2698. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law, 42. 
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other model of judicial review can match’.39 Proportionality’s elevation of 
reasonableness as the core logic of constitutional justice thus takes its force 
and appeal in large measure from its imagined ability to suppress its 
alternative – the presence of interest, identity, will, and the political in 
constitutional judgment. 
Yet how dependent has this picture of constitutionalism defined by 
proportionality been on the success of claims about secularism? The 
perduring and vital presence of religion in the public sphere troubles this 
account of proportionality as the multi-tool fitted to questions of 
constitutional justice. It does so, first, by challenging the adequacy of the 
methods of proportionality reasoning in dealing with issues related to 
religion and religious rights. Theorists have articulated different models 
of how proportionality reasoning works. In some understandings, 
proportionality involves a direct balancing of competing rights and 
principles.40 For others, the competing principles are instead measured 
against some ‘common yardstick’41 or by reference to the extent that each 
advances an underlying norm.42 In either understanding, however, when 
religion is involved there must be some assessment of the constitutional 
‘good’ of religion and the extent to which it is implicated in the given case. 
And yet it turns out that we are unsure how to measure and weigh 
religion for the purposes of constitutional analysis.43 To do so requires 
generating a theory of the constitutional value of religion and, as scholarly 
                                                 
39 Ibid, 171. 
40 This is Alexy’s model as reflected in his ‘Law of Balancing’. See Alexy, A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights. 
41 Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing’, 105. 
42 This is, for example, Weinrib’s conception, in which ‘the yardstick against which these 
quantities are set is the ideal of public justice or human dignity under law’: Weinrib, Dimensions 
of Dignity, 229. For Weinrib, this means that ‘[p]roportionality reflects the absolute duty of 
government to bring the existing legal order into the deepest possible conformity with human 
dignity’. Ibid, 240. 
43 Others have noted the problematic character of this exercise of assigning weight to 
constitutional interests, making the point by reference to other constitutional rights and interests; 
the discussion often revolves around the problem of ‘incommensurability’ in constitutional 
proportionality reasoning. See, eg, Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality; Webber, The 
Negotiable Constitution. Again, my claim is not that religion is unique in raising this problem, 
even if it is uniquely good at doing so. 
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debates have shown, we are not equipped with a clear sense of what it is 
about religion that attracts our constitutional regard.44 Moreover, effective 
proportionality review in matters of religion would also seem to require 
descending into the spiritual infrastructure of an individual or 
community’s life – something to which liberal constitutionalism is allergic, 
not to mention ill-equipped to do – in order to assign a ‘gravity’ to the 
state’s interference with a religious practice or belief. One sees here how 
much proportionality, as an account of the heart of liberal 
constitutionalism, depends on an assumption about ‘the progressive 
immanence of our concerns and our references’.45  Proportionality may 
work more or less well for the weighing of immanent concerns; however, 
the unsettling of secularism denies us confidence that the nature of the 
interests and preoccupations of those who come before the courts have 
that immanent quality.  
As a result, we find cases in which proportionality seems to founder 
as means of assessing the constitutionally just. In Canada, one thinks of the 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony case, in which the Supreme Court was 
called upon to assess whether a government requirement for photographs 
on drivers’ licences was a proportional limit on the religious freedoms of 
an insular agrarian Hutterite community whose interpretation of the 
second commandment translated into a prohibition on having one’s 
photograph taken. Drawn into the proportionality analysis that is the heart 
of Canadian constitutional adjudication, the majority of the Court 
explained that the burden on the members of Wilson Colony was best 
characterized in terms of costs – ‘costs on the religious practitioner in terms 
of money, tradition or inconvenience’ 46  – and that those costs were 
relatively trivial in comparison to the state interest in a secure photo 
                                                 
44 For an excellent recent treatment of this problem, see Jamal, ‘Considering Freedom of 
Religion’. For an example of a debate driven by the indeterminacy about the ‘good’ protected by 
religion in liberal constitutions, see Christopher L Eisgruber and Lawrence G Sager, Religious 
Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2007); Jeremy 
Webber, ‘Understanding the Religion in Freedom of Religion’ in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and 
Zoe Robinson (eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 26. 
45 Sullivan et al., ‘Introduction’, 1. 
46 Wilson Colony, [95]. 
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licensing scheme. Many have critiqued this decision as failing to capture 
what was at stake for the religious community. 47  To be sure, the 
assessment could have been performed better and more sensitively; and, 
indeed, the dissenting judgment written by Justice Abella did a far better 
job of accounting for the impacts of the photo requirement on the life of 
the community. And yet, for the reasons I have described, the ability to 
weigh religion seems always out of reach, pointing to a weakness in 
proportionality as an analytic tool in arriving at constitutional justice.48  
The point is well made by the facts of another Canadian case, AC.49 
The question here was whether the religious freedom right of a 15-year-
old Jehovah’s Witness entitled her to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion. 
The majority of the Court avoided the core constitutional question, relying 
instead on an admixture of statutory interpretation and future exercises of 
discretion. The evasion was understandable. What would a 
proportionality analysis that gave sensitive regard to the religious interests 
in the case look like? It would have to wrestle with the subject’s 
transcendent and metaphysical concerns – the immortal life of her soul – 
and weigh that against the state’s interest in the preservation of life. Again, 
proportionality review as a measure of the just seems to stumble over the 
questions raised by religion as an assertive and insistent part of our social 
worlds. Something more or different is needed to meet the judgmental 
burdens imposed by such questions. 
                                                 
47 For my criticisms, see Benjamin L Berger, ‘Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning, and Cultural 
Difference: Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony’ (2010) 51 
Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 25. 
48 In this vein, Kai Möller, critical of Alexy’s approach, suggests that dealing with constitutional 
rights will inevitably involve moral arguments, not simply proportionality review. See Kai 
Möller, ‘Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional Rights’ (2007) 5 ICON 453. It might be 
that other models or accounts of proportionality, in particular those that embrace a normative 
view of the balancing involved could fare better (see eg Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity, arguing 
that balancing should occur in reference to ‘human dignity’, and Barak, The Judge in a 
Democracy, structuring his account of balancing around ‘society’s values’). Nevertheless, the 
specific issues that I have described as associated with the constitutional adjudication of religion 
– understanding why we protect religion, the need to engage with the spiritual infrastructure of 
religious lives, and how these impact on the weighing or balancing of religion – still pose a 
challenge to these models. 
49 AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30. 
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Yet, beyond questioning its internal adequacy as a tool, the 
instability of the secular also seems to unsettle the descriptive claim that, 
in modern liberal constitutionalism, proportionality review is the key task 
or the principal business of a judge in a democracy. The wish that this were 
so is understandable enough. Proportionality’s foundation in formal 
reason rescues the liberal constitutional judge from the messiness of 
history, identity, symbolic interpretation, and the like. Describing 
constitutional adjudication in terms of proportionality places the 
legitimacy of judicial review on somewhat safer ground. Yet it turns out 
that, faced with publicly assertive forms of religion and the associated 
exposure of the residual privilege enjoyed by the religions around whom 
the secular status quo was formed, judges in democracies have often 
instead been preoccupied with the task of symbolic interpretation and 
identity construction. And those are tasks that emphatically raise the basic 
questions at the heart of debates on the legitimacy of judicial review: to 
borrow from Joel Bakan’s excellent distillation, why should we trust 
judges’ decisions on those kinds of issues and why would we think that 
they are more likely to arrive at truth on such matters?50 Balancing and 
proportionality have been part of the picture, to be sure. However, a glance 
at the cases about religion that have found their way to constitutional 
courts puts proportionality in its place as but one piece – and arguably not 
the most significant – of what constitutional adjudication involves. 
  In Canada, a recent case concerning prayer at a municipal council, 
Saguenay,51 makes the point well. At issue was whether the practice of 
beginning municipal council meetings in the town of Saguenay, Québec, 
with a palpably Christian (and, specifically, Roman Catholic) prayer – 
following which those who did not wish to be present for the prayer could 
enter the council chamber – offended the freedom of religion and 
conscience of non-believers. Concluding that this practice was 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court leaned on the concept of state 
neutrality and explained the exclusionary communicative effects of this 
public prayer. Given the complicated history of Catholicism in the 
                                                 
50 Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1997). 
51 Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16. 
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province of Québec, the task of the Court was to interpret the character of 
this prayer (and prayer generally), assess it against the historical backdrop 
of religion in Québec, imagine the communicative effect on listeners, and 
make claims about the character of the modern state. Proportionality 
reasoning was a marginal aspect of the decision, with these symbolic, 
political, and historical claims featuring far more prominently.  
The same lesson emerges as one looks at law and religion cases that 
have emerged elsewhere in the world. The nature and meaning of prayer 
was at the heart of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v 
Galloway,52 and in Elk Grove v Nedow53 the Court ruled on the reference to 
God in the pledge of allegiance, ultimately arguing that it represented a 
permissible form of ‘ceremonial deism’ that needed to be understood in 
the frame of American national history and identity. In the (in)famous case 
of Lautsi, the pivotal task for the European Court of Human Rights was 
defining the meaning of the crucifix on the walls of Italian classrooms, a 
task that required reconciling the demand for state neutrality with the role 
of Catholicism in shaping Italian national identity.54 That Court’s burden 
in Sahin was to interpret the symbolic significance of the headscarf within 
the frame of Kemalism and the Islamic revival in Turkey.55 And in JFS,56 
the UK Supreme Court was called upon to rule as to whether ‘Jewishness’ 
was a religious or ethnic feature.  
These are the kinds of cases that reflect the social facts and pressures 
associated with the unsettling of the secular. By the light of such cases, the 
assertion that proportionality analysis is the key task of a constitutional 
judge or the central measure of constitutional justice is somewhat 
mystifying. Rather than a balancing or the measuring of competing 
interests against a common normative yardstick, constitutional 
adjudication in matters of religion appears fundamentally as a 
symbolizing practice, one whereby the courts use law to make claims 
                                                 
52 134 S Ct 1811 (2014). 
53 Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004). 
54 Lautsi v Italy (2011) 54 EHRR 3. 
55 Leyla Sahin v Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR 5. 
56 R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15. 
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about national identity, history, and value. The status of proportionality as 
the grand idea of liberal constitutionalism thus seems seriously troubled 
by a social world that resists easy claims about secularism. It is troubled 
both in its capacity to carry off the tasks assigned to it and as a description 
of what modern constitutionalism demands of the judge. Perhaps it is only 
under the conceits of secularism that a scholar can boast of the universality 
of proportionality and claim that, ‘[o]n a shrinking planet, it is 
appropriately multicultural.’57  
 
The Centrality of Rights Constitutionalism 
 
 It is commonplace to observe that the gaze of liberal constitutional 
thought has been principally focused on the individual and the character 
of the package of fundamental rights and freedoms to which she is 
entitled. Rights constitutionalism is imagined as both the core and the 
vanguard of modern constitutional thought and practice. This focus on 
rights-based protections as the heart of modern constitutionalism is, in 
fact, another expression of the ambition to universality at work in the 
veneration of proportionality. This is the constitutionalism that is reflected 
in Canada in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which now occupies the 
centre of public consciousness about what constitutionalism entails. It is 
the constitutionalism of the American Bill of Rights and of the package of 
‘universal declarations’ that aspire to shape the project of European 
constitutionalism. Based, as it is, on more or less universal claims about 
the human and human flourishing, liberal rights constitutionalism offers 
itself as distinctively mobile, applicable to anyone, anywhere. This 
mobility allows for (indeed, invites) substantial borrowing across 
                                                 
57 Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law, 168. 
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constitutional traditions, 58  thereby facilitating the ‘migration of 
constitutional ideas’.59 
And yet there is an older – perhaps ‘ancient’ – idea of constitutions 
that is centrally concerned with the local, the political, the historically 
contingent, and ‘harmonious relations between cultures’ 60  and 
communities. This is the sense of constitutions as political devices aimed 
at working out local problems among particular interests in a given place. 
It reflects a different logic of constitutionalism, one concerned with the 
particular, rather than the universal. 
Canada is manifestly a child of both logics. Its comparatively new 
Charter reflects the drive towards the universal; the much older features of 
the constitution that relate to the relationship between the French and 
English, its federal structure, and the relationship to Indigenous peoples, 
are all expressions of the particular. The insistent trend of modern 
constitutionalism has been to privilege the universal through emphasis on 
rights constitutionalism. And yet all constitutions are amalgams of both 
logics.61 
As faith in the categories and conceits of the secular wanes, we are 
reminded of the importance – even, perhaps, the centrality – of that ancient 
idea of a constitution that is concerned with relationships among 
communities, sources of legal authority, and the structural issues of 
constitutional law and practice. To be sure, rights constitutionalism 
                                                 
58 Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Hirschl explains that constitutional courts engage in 
‘borrowing’ with respect to rights issues far more than structural or formative dimensions of 
constitutional law. 
59 Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
60 Frank R Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1977) ix. 
61 Benjamin L Berger, ‘Children of Two Logics: A Way into Canadian Constitutional Culture’ 
(2013) 11 ICON 319. I argue in this piece that the points at which the march of the logic of 
universal reason meets resistance in the particular are key junctures for understanding a country’s 
constitutional culture because they are points at which the social and the political, which sit at the 
heart of every constitution no matter how modern and committed to universal reason, shine 
through. 
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sweeps up and deals with some matters raised by religious difference. But 
freedom of religion and conscience and rights to religious equality have 
proven inadequate to the task of sorting through many of the most salient 
issues related to the assertive presence of public religion. In this way, the 
social facts and issues that have disrupted faith in the secular have also 
exposed the misleading nature of imagining that the vanguard and future 
of constitutionalism lies in the refinement and development of the 
universal logic of rights.  
One could make this point by reference to recent experiences of 
constitutional design. For countries in which the influence and social 
salience of religion cannot be contained within a claim about secularism, 
the most complicated set of questions have been of the ‘older’ 
constitutional variety: what sources of law ought to be acknowledged? 
What ought to be the relationships between religious communities and 
political authority?62 Legal rights have been something of a side issue. But 
as it turns out, this lesson has also emerged out of established 
constitutional systems in which rights constitutionalism enjoys a 
prominent imaginative profile. Religion has forced such systems to 
confront questions drawn from that older, less liberally beguiling, model 
of constitutionalism. 
Recent years have seen a fascinating institutionalist turn in the 
structure of debates about religious difference and constitutionalism. 
Confronted with the failure of individual rights of freedom of religion and 
conscience to adequately address entire dimensions of the interests and 
concerns of religious communities, claims have shifted away from such 
rights and towards arguments for the constitutional autonomy and 
privileges of religious institutions.63 
                                                 
62 See Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2010). 
63 On this religious ‘institutionalism’, see Victor Manuel Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of 
Pluralism: On the Authority of Associations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014); Victor 
Muñiz-Fraticelli and Lawrence David, ‘Religious Institutionalism in a Canadian Context’ (2016) 
52 Osgoode Hall LJ 1049; Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson (eds), The Rise 
of Corporate Religious Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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One of the most striking examples in this respect is the US case of 
Hosanna-Tabor.64 Returning from disability leave to find that the Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church had hired someone to replace her, a 
grade school teacher threatened to file suit pursuant to federal anti-
discrimination laws. In reaction, the Church fired her, essentially for 
‘going to law’. When the case made its way to the courts, the Church 
argued that it enjoyed a ‘ministerial exception’, which meant that it was 
not subject to legal restrictions in its decisions about its religious leaders. 
The unanimous Supreme Court agreed, holding that this ministerial 
exception (an aspect of the Establishment Clause) exempted the Church 
from federal anti-discrimination protections. Chief Justice Roberts 
reasoned that ‘[t]he church must be free to choose those who will guide it 
on its way’.65 As Winnifred Sullivan has pointed out, this turn to ‘the 
church’ marks a significant moment in US constitutional law. 66  It 
introduces an institutionalist dimension into the management of religious 
diversity in the United States, highlighting the entity of ‘church’ in the 
constitutional picture, and thereby focusing attention on the deeper 
relationship between religion and state and the legitimacy of constitutional 
authority over religion. Although integrated into the language of the First 
Amendment, this is not essentially a rights-based decision; it is more akin 
to a concordat regulating the relationship between the Vatican and the 
Italian State than an exercise in modern liberal constitutionalism.  
In Canada, the recent Trinity Western case was an instance of this 
institutionalist turn in claims for religious freedom. 67  Trinity Western 
University is an Evangelical Christian university that sought to establish 
the first private, ‘faith-based’ law school in Canada, a project aimed at 
affording a Canadian legal education in a ‘Christian learning 
                                                 
64 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 565 US 171 (2012). 
65 Ibid, 196. 
66 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, ‘“The Church”’, The Immanent Frame, 31 January 2012 
<https://tif.ssrc.org/2012/01/31/the-church/>. 
67 Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32; Trinity Western 
University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33. For a more elaborated account of, and 
perspective on, the issues involved in this case, see the chapter by Janet Epp Buckingham in this 
Research Handbook, ch 20. 
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community’.68 The University requires all community members to sign a 
‘community covenant’ that, among other things, prohibits sexual 
relationships between same-sex married couples. After charged public 
debate, two provincial law societies ultimately denied accreditation to the 
law school on the basis that the insistence on this code of conduct 
represents a form of institutional discrimination that contravenes legal 
guarantees of sexual equality. Drawing inspiration from a recent decision 
that represented the Supreme Court’s most extensive recognition of the 
collective and social dimensions of freedom of religion,69 Trinity Western 
University responded to these denials by noting its institutional exemption 
from provincial human rights legislation and arguing that the law 
societies’ decisions contravened the constitutional guarantee of religious 
freedom. Although there was also an individual claimant involved, the 
case was, at its heart, about a community’s argument for political 
autonomy and institutional independence from public law norms. A 
majority of the Supreme Court found against Trinity Western and, though 
it essentially evaded this fundamental group rights question in its reasons, 
the decision generated a strong dissent and has fed ongoing scholarly and 
public controversy about the rights of religious communities vis-à-vis the 
state. As the case suggests, religious education is a particular flashpoint for 
this institutionalist or collectivist turn, with the complicated confluence of 
state and community interests making the set of issues involved in such 
cases irreducible to matters of individual rights.70  Religious education 
cases instead require reflection on and negotiation around the relationship 
                                                 
68 Trinity Western University Proposed School of Law, ‘Why Trinity Western University’s 
School of Law?’ Trinity Western University, <https://www.twu.ca/academics/schools-
faculties/proposed-school-law>. 
69 Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, which involved a Roman 
Catholic high school’s argument that it should be free to teach the state-mandated Ethics and 
Religious Cultures curriculum from a Catholic perspective.  A majority of the Court accepted 
that the collective dimensions of religious freedom prohibited the government from mandating 
how, as a Catholic institution, Loyola taught its own students about Catholicism.  The minority 
reasons in the case went so far as to hold that the religious organization itself could enjoy the 
protection of freedom of religion. 
70 See, eg, Loyola and, in the UK, the JFS case.  
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between religious communities and state authority. Such matters are 
inescapably local, historical, political, and particular.71 
This renaissance of religious institutions and organizations as a 
matter for constitutional reflection is, thus, one example of how the facts 
associated with the unsettling of secularism have also destabilized the 
centrality of liberal rights constitutionalism in our accounts of modern 
constitutional law and practice. 
Another such example revolves around questions of legal pluralism 
and sources of law. As religion demonstrates its energetic public presence, 
the normative dimension of religious life also shows itself, pluralizing law 
and putting questions around the recognition of religious legal orders and 
the authority and supremacy of state law firmly on the table. These are 
emphatically constitutional issues, but are not satisfyingly digestible as 
issues of rights constitutionalism.  
The debate about ‘sharia arbitration’ in Ontario illustrates this well. 
In the fall of 2003, an organization called the Islamic Institute of Civil 
Justice proposed the use of arbitration tribunals that would resolve civil 
matters – particularly family law and inheritance disputes – through the 
application of principles of Islamic law.72 Although the law in Ontario had 
permitted private arbitration of disputes based on agreed-upon principles 
of law for almost 25 years, this proposal produced something of a ‘moral 
panic’ 73  and presented a substantial political question: should Islamic 
arbitration be permitted? Faced with strong opposition to the use of 
religious law to settle civil disputes, the Government of Ontario 
commissioned a report on the matter. Although the report came back 
recommending that, with the addition of certain safeguards, religious 
arbitration be permitted, the Government ultimately introduced 
                                                 
71 In Canada, Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609, sharply dramatized the force of the historical 
and particular in matters of religious education, holding that the right to religious funding of 
Catholic schools, guaranteed in the 1867 constitution, however discriminatory and reflective of a 
state-sponsored privilege for one religion, was immune from attack through doctrines of religious 
freedom and equality, reflected in the 1982 Charter. 
72 I discuss this episode in the modern history of law and religion in Canada at greater length in 
Berger, Law’s Religion. 
73 Sherene Razack, ‘The “Sharia Law Debate” in Ontario: The Modernity/Premodernity 
Distinction in Legal Efforts to Protect Women from Culture’ (2007) 15 Fem LS 3, 7. 
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legislation purporting to ban all religious arbitration, with the Premier 
declaring that it would ensure that there was ‘one law for all’.  
The claim ‘one law for all’ is an innately constitutional claim. But a 
religiously diverse social world, which includes religions for which the 
legal dimension of the tradition is robust, means that this claim is at best 
aspirational, but certainly not descriptive. Negotiating this condition of 
legal pluralism emerges as an important dimension of modern 
constitutionalism. We see this in the transnational issue of whether to 
enforce religious divorce and family law arrangements through state 
courts. In Canada, that issue appeared in the case of Bruker v Markovitz.74 
The question was whether to award damages for a husband’s refusal to 
provide a ghet. The packaging of this problem as one of religious freedom 
belied the real problematic, which was the relationship between ‘secular’ 
state and religious law. One sees the challenges surrounding that 
relationship played out fortissimo in places like Israel and India, where 
religious law has formal status in the state legal architecture, but they are 
intrinsic to the experience of religious pluralism. These issues flow from 
the basic question of how the state should relate to religious legal orders: 
a query that reaches back to the kinds of constitutional problems wrestled 
with in the wake of the Papal Revolution far more than it reaches forward 
into an era of the increasingly universal application of legal rights.  
In his account of the challenges associated with the destabilization 
of political secularism, Tariq Modood argues that ‘the novelty, which then 
has implications for Christians and secularists and to which they are 
reacting, is the appearance of an assertive multiculturalism which cannot 
be contained within a matrix of individual rights, conscience, religion [sic] 
freedom, and so on’.75 Otherwise put, the character and implications of 
religious difference have overflowed folk accounts of secularism and, with 
it, have evaded the tools of rights constitutionalism. One way of 
understanding the nature of this overflowing is that the form of religiosity 
that was already ‘bargained for’ in a secularist account buttressed by 
individual rights – an internal, believed, private form of religion – no 
longer reflects our social lives. And as a result, we find ourselves presented 
                                                 
74 2007 SCC 54. 
75 Modood, ‘Western Europe’, 145. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269536 
 
 
Forthcoming in Rex Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton, 
Mass: Edward Elgar, 2018) (Pre-publication Version) 
 25 
with questions whose character and demands disturb accounts of 
contemporary constitutionalism in which liberal rights are central. 
 
Legitimacy, Authority, and the Fading Salience of Sovereignty 
 
 The capacity of religion to de-centre rights constitutionalism 
ultimately points to a third element of the constitutional common sense 
that is unsteadied by a social world that resists the claims of secularism: 
the fading salience of sovereignty. 
The desire to find a ground for the authority and legitimacy of 
constitutional law not based in normative visions or identity claims has 
been, in large measure, motivated by an awareness of the challenges of 
religious difference. That awareness was an explicit impetus for Rawls’ 
work and it drove the liberal political and legal theory that took its cue 
from him. 76  Yet religion has ultimately proven to be a distinctively 
powerful device for showing frailties in the idea that an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ based on the fruits of public reason can be a satisfying basis for 
claims of legal and political authority. The assertive public force of 
religious difference has shown the shortcomings of the idea that there is a 
road that bypasses historical specificity, identity, ontology, and 
metaphysics, but that nevertheless delivers one to a satisfying account of 
constitutional legitimacy. The precise point of disruptive intervention has 
been to make deeply problematic the tenability of bracketing one’s 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ or larger metaphysical and normative 
conceptions of the good when engaging in public reasoning – a pivotal 
move for the success of such theories. As a phenomenological matter, 
religion has simply proven more unruly, more insistently ‘political’, and 
generally less containable than the demands for this move allow – the same 
realizations that have led to a disruption of faith in secularism.  
As cases concerning issues like same-sex marriage, medically-
assisted suicide, and polygamy have accumulated, the idea that 
constitutional law can successfully base its claim of legitimacy and 
                                                 
76 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (2nd edn, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005). 
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authority on grounds of law’s neutrality and on reason-based consensus 
begin to appear less convincing. Engagement with religious diversity has 
exposed constitutionalism as its own cultural enterprise, rich with senses 
of the subject, of authority, space, time, and value. 77  Its categories for 
analysis and underlying commitments are partial, in both senses of the 
word.78 But if convergence and neutrality do not seem up to the task of 
underwriting state legal authority, we become aware of a group of legal 
subjects returning to those core questions of constitutional law and theory: 
‘Why does this bind me?’, ‘What is its authority over me?’ And with this, 
I suggest, we are called to examine the abiding role of sovereignty in our 
contemporary constitutional lives.  
For liberal constitutionalism, appeals to sovereignty have an 
antique and even embarrassing feel to them. As Kahn explains, ‘[c]laims 
of sovereignty reflect a community’s understanding of itself as embodying 
a distinct set of meanings that are substantive not formal, realized at a 
particular historical moment, and limited to members’.79 The desire to base 
the character and cogency of law in universal reason – a leitmotif in this 
chapter – is in part an artefact of the ambition to release us from the burden 
of such illiberal claims. ‘Traditionally, sovereignty was thought to precede 
law’; 80  the hope of liberal constitutional thought is that, through the 
universality of reason and rights, ‘law is to be freed from sovereignty’.81 
But with the conventional liberal ground for legitimacy unsettled by 
religious diversity, claims for the authority of law based in sovereignty – 
the popular sovereignty of ‘who we are’ and ‘what we are’, as Kahn’s 
explanation reflects – seem to re-emerge, rushing in to fill the vacuum. 
Sovereignty reappears, actively shaping our legal debates and practices; it 
                                                 
77 I have developed this idea at length in Berger, Law’s Religion. 
78 See ibid, 62–104. 
79 Paul W Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004), 
11. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, 12. 
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is no longer simply ‘latent in the constitutional state’82 or ‘only an abstract 
subject for the ascription of acts of public authority’.83 
This is one way of understanding the ‘Islamic headscarf’ 
controversy in France, centred around the 2003 Stasi Commission report. 
Talal Asad tells the story in just this way. He argues that one can look past 
the abstract arguments about laïcité to see deeper concerns about the 
identity of the French republic and the sovereign character of the state.84 
What troubled the state about the ‘appearance’ of the Islamic headscarf 
was not the garment itself, but ‘the actor’s will to display it’, 85  which 
seemed to symbolize a resistance to the universal character of French 
republican identity and the sovereignty of the state built on that identity. 
The authority of the resulting legal regulation of the headscarf was not 
based on consensus or reason, but on assertions of sovereignty and the 
authority of the state.86 This leads Asad to the provocative claim ‘that the 
French secular state today abides in a sense by the cuius region eius religio 
principle’:87  whose realm, his religion. Liberal constitutionalism does not 
have the tools to reckon with such a governing principle, utterly saturated 
as it is by sovereignty. Nor, as a result, does it have a convincing account 
for this episode, centrally concerned as it was with the meaning of 
symbols, history, and claims about national identity. The authority and 
legitimacy of state law’s response to this ‘veil affair’ were not and could 
not be found in overlapping consensus or neutrality; instead, however 
                                                 
82 Dieter Grimm, Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 2015) 72. Grimm does not suggest that sovereignty has no role 
in a modern constitutional state; rather, his claim is that, apart from its relevance to federalism 
issues and international questions (what he calls ‘external sovereignty’), the nature of modern 
constitutionalism ‘has made the sovereign invisible (ibid, 73). My argument is that the unsettling 
of secularism brings the sovereign back into our field of vision.  
83 Ibid, 73. 
84 Asad, Formations of the Secular. 
85 Ibid, 97. 
86 Asad explains that ‘[t]he banning of the veil as a sign can therefore be seen as an exercise in 
sovereign power, an attempt by a centralized state to dominate public space as the space of 
particular signs’, ibid, 101. 
87 Ibid, 94. 
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embarrassing to a liberal constitutional order, it was to be found in claims 
of sovereignty. 
In Canada, the continued salience of sovereignty to contemporary 
constitutionalism can be seen in a variety of examples involving legal and 
political encounters with religious difference and the reckoning with the 
instability of the secular. One potent example arises from an ongoing 
controversy about the nature and demands of secularism in Quebec, a 
controversy that has contours very similar to the French episode that so 
interested Asad. In the fall of 2013, a minority sovereigntist Parti 
Québécois (PQ) government introduced Bill 60, a bill referred to as the 
‘Charter of Québec Values’ or, in much of the debate that ensued, the 
‘Charter of Secularism’.88 This Bill declared the religious neutrality and 
secular nature of the state and proposed a contentious prohibition on 
employees of public bodies from wearing ‘ostentatious’ or conspicuous 
religious symbols, such as turbans, kippot, and headscarves. This 
proposed ban charted out a form of secularism for Québec quite at odds 
with Canadian multiculturalism, and most agreed that this proposal was 
unconstitutional as measured against the rights protections in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The best interpretation of this 
move, however, was as part of a continuous constitutional story in Canada 
whereby claims about Quebec’s distinctive status in Canadian federalism 
and its political independence are based, in part, on a very different 
relationship with religion than is found elsewhere in Canada.89 In the early 
constitutional life of the country, this unique relationship was Quebec’s 
Roman Catholic identity, in contrast to the Protestantism of English 
Canada, and this matured into its rejection of multiculturalism and 
embrace of a French-style laïcité as its interpretation of the demands of 
secularism. Throughout, the structural relationship has remained the 
same: distinctiveness within Canadian federalism is asserted by means of 
articulating a relationship with religious difference. Such claims, so thick 
                                                 
88 Bill 60, Charter affirming the values of state secularism and religious neutrality and of equality 
between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 1st Sess, 
40th Leg, Québec, 2013. 
89 I explore this interpretation in greater detail in Benjamin L Berger, ‘Faith in Sovereignty: 
Religion and Secularism in the Politics of Canadian Federalism’ (2014) 35 Istituzioni del 
Federalismo 939. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269536 
 
 
Forthcoming in Rex Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton, 
Mass: Edward Elgar, 2018) (Pre-publication Version) 
 29 
with ideas of the identity of the political community, are difficult to digest 
within accounts of political and legal liberalism. Rather, they are – 
consonant with Kahn’s description of sovereignty claims – reflective of ‘a 
community’s understanding of itself as embodying a distinct set of 
meanings that are substantive not formal, realized at a particular historical 
moment, and limited to members’.90 
Many of the examples explored in the previous section similarly 
push us into the arms of an account of the authority and legitimacy of 
constitutional law not based on convergence or reasonable consensus, but 
on assertions of sovereignty. There is a connection between the decentring 
of rights constitutionalism and a renewed awareness of the abiding 
salience of claims of sovereignty in our constitutional lives. As the former 
shifts, we gain a better line of sight on the latter. For example, the questions 
of legal pluralism raised by religious difference ultimately call on courts 
and other legal actors to account for the relationship of authority between 
state law and religious legal orders, a relationship that invites appeals to 
sovereignty. This was clear in Premier McGuinty’s claim of ‘one law for 
all’ as a response to the sharia arbitration debate: ‘one law for all’ is really 
‘one law for all of us’, an assertion that draws out the relations of legal 
authority, group membership, and popular sovereignty. Similarly, the 
negotiation of the relationship between religious communities and 
state/constitutional authority required by the institutionalist turn raises 
questions of a character that do not appear resolvable by resort to claims 
for constitutional authority based on overlapping consensus or rational 
neutrality. The relationship between church and state, the authority of 
religious law versus that of constitutional law: these are irreducibly 
matters involving questions of sovereignty and call for responses drawn 
from that register. 
A powerful final example of the way in which claims about religion 
have a distinctive capacity to expose the work that sovereignty continues 
to do in the practice and structure of constitutional law in Canada comes 
from a recent freedom of religion claim involving Indigenous religion. Of 
course, sovereignty’s continued role in questions of constitutional justice 
is conspicuous in all issues that involve Indigenous peoples. Claims for 
                                                 
90 Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place, 11. 
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Aboriginal rights, title over land, or the enforcement of historical treaties 
all manifestly take place on a terrain of contested sovereignty. What was 
unique about the Ktunaxa Nation91 case was that it involved a claim for the 
protection of Indigenous religion through the general guarantee of 
freedom of religion pursuant to s 2(a) of the Charter. The Ktunaxa asserted 
that the government’s approval of a large resort development project in a 
region of British Columbia called the Jumbo Valley or, for the Ktunaxa, 
Qat’muk, offended their religious freedom. The Ktunaxa believe that the 
valley is the home of the Grizzly Bear Spirit, a figure of spiritual 
significance to the Ktunaxa, and that the construction of permanent 
accommodations would drive the Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk. 
Proceeding with the development would, thus, ‘irrevocably impair their 
religious beliefs and practices’.92 The Court euphemistically characterizes 
this as ‘a novel claim’.93 It was, in fact, a claim with radically subversive 
potential. Given the connection between Indigenous religion and the 
land, 94  and the wide definition of religious freedom in Canadian 
jurisprudence to that point, this claim had profoundly disruptive potential 
for the Crown use and control of land and its resources. 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the 
Ktunaxa’s claim, and did so in a way that points to the energetic work that 
state sovereignty claims continue to do in shaping constitutional justice. 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rowe, writing for a majority of the 
Court, conclude that the Ktunaxa’s claim falls outside the scope of freedom 
of religion because they were seeking to protect not their beliefs and 
practices, but rather the Grizzly Bear Spirit itself. The majority explains 
that ‘the Charter protects the freedom to worship, but does not protect the 
spiritual focal point of worship’.95 But of course, unlike the other traditions 
with which the Court is accustomed in its freedom of religion 
                                                 
91 Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 
SCC 54. 
92 Ibid, [6]. 
93 Ibid, [70]. 
94 John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2010) 
239. 
95 Ktunaxa Nation, [71]. 
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jurisprudence, the ‘spiritual focal point of worship’ for the Ktunaxa is 
vulnerable to state interference: the Grizzly Bear Spirit is tied to the land. 
Justice Moldaver, in separate reasons, rightly points to this distinguishing 
feature, explaining that ‘[f]or Indigenous religions, state action that 
impacts land can therefore sever the connection to the divine, rendering 
beliefs and practices devoid of their spiritual significance’.96 The majority’s 
approach, therefore, ‘risks foreclosing the protections of s. 2(a) of the 
Charter to substantial elements of Indigenous religious traditions’.97 And 
yet, though he would have therefore found that the approval infringed the 
Ktunaxa’s freedom of religion, Justice Moldaver justified the government’s 
decision as ‘reasonable in the circumstances’.98  His reasons expose the 
extent to which the result in this case is underwritten by legitimizing a 
priori sovereignty claims. To accede to the Ktunaxa’s claim would allow 
them ‘to veto development over the land’99 and ‘would effectively transfer 
the public’s control of the use of over fifty square kilometres of land to the 
Ktunaxa’.100 Justice Moldaver explains:  
This placed the Minister in a difficult, if not impossible, 
position. He determined that if he granted the power of 
exclusion to the Ktunaxa, this would significantly hamper, if 
not prevent, him from fulfilling his statutory objectives: to 
administer Crown land and to dispose of it in the public 
interest.101 
The pivotal phrase here is ‘Crown land’. Is Qat’muk Crown land to be 
disposed of in the public interest? That question – the status of that land 
and the sovereignty claim over it – is the irreducible political core of such 
disputes between the state and Indigenous peoples. Although this is 
somewhat less obvious in the majority’s decision owing to the choice to 
treat this as a matter of the scope of the right rather than one of justification, 
                                                 
96 Ibid, [127]. 
97 Ibid, [131]. 
98 Ibid, [155]. 
99 Ibid, [150]. 
100 Ibid, [152]. 
101 Ibid, [154]. 
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the effacing of the link between land and religion evidences similar 
concerns and preoccupations. A tantalizing tell comes in the majority’s 
initial description of the facts. The majority explains that the area in 
dispute ‘is located in a Canadian valley in the northwestern part of the 
larger Ktunaxa territory’.102 Is it a ‘Canadian valley’ or is it part of ‘Ktunaxa 
territory’? The shearing forces within this facially anodyne statement are 
the forces exerted by sovereignty claims. Imaginatively, both decisions 
begin from an assertion of state sovereignty over the land; they proceed 
from, are shaped by, and ultimately return to that imaginative foundation. 
Each of these examples demonstrates the way in which a public and 
political pertinence of religion that is incommensurable with folk claims 
about political secularism disrupts a treasured conceit of liberal 
constitutional thought and practice: that the work of constitutional justice 
can be done, and can be understood, without recourse to the kinds of claims 
about historical particularity, community identity, and – yes – metaphysics 
and ontology, associated with assertions of sovereign authority. They 
challenge accounts of modern constitutionalism premised on ‘the minor 
importance of the concept of sovereignty to the interpretation and 
application of constitutions’.103 In each example, the work of contending 
with religion reveals that more constitutional justice than we are 
comfortable admitting is shaped by conceptions and claims of sovereignty. 
As the picture of the social world painted by a simple story of secularism 
becomes more complicated and less plausible, so too does the wish for a 




 Liberal constitutional theory and practice has, I have argued, 
proceeded on an unacknowledged faith in a certain conception of the 
secular that is reasonably descriptive of the place of religion in 
contemporary society, and where not descriptive, at least affords a 
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reasonably coherent regulative ideal. Yet the facts surrounding the abiding 
public presence and assertiveness of religion in our social and political 
lives resist that description, and the concept of the secular has proven too 
complex, variable, and untidy to offer stable footing. The faith thus 
disrupted, certain features of our constitutional theory and practice 
themselves become unsettled. Proportionality seems troubled both in its 
capacity to carry off the task assigned to it and as a description of the 
central feature of modern constitutional adjudication, which, in matters of 
religion, seems to be a practice thick with symbolic interpretation 
informed by claims about identity and history. Rights constitutionalism 
assumes a more modest position within the features of modern 
constitutional life, with structural issues that wrestle with the presence of 
multiple salient sources of normative ordering coming into our field of 
view. And confidence in the fading salience of sovereignty as a player in 
the structure of constitutional authority and legitimacy seems ill placed.  
Philip Selznick once described the sociology of law ‘as an attempt 
to marshal what we know about the natural elements of social life and to 
bring that knowledge to bear on a consciously sustained enterprise, 
governed by special objectives and ideals’.105 Martin Krygier explains that 
in describing the features of social life as ‘natural’, Selznick meant to 
capture the idea that ‘[s]ociety is a natural, if naturally variable, response 
to the character and coincidence of human nature, needs, strivings, and 
particular circumstances’. 106  Approached as ‘a consciously sustained 
enterprise, governed by special objectives and ideals’, law, for Selznick, ‘is 
a kind of activity carried on by living [people] in living institutions, subject 
to all the external pressures and constraints, and all the inner sources of 
recalcitrance, that frustrate ideal ends’. 107  Selznick’s particular 
understanding of the task of legal sociology was, thus, to bring the ideals, 
objectives, and project of law into conversation with what we know about 
the real circumstances, needs, and character of social life. 
                                                 
105 Philip Selznick, ‘Sociology of Law’ in Robert King Merton et al. (eds), Sociology Today: 
Problems and Prospects (New York, Basic Books, 1959) 116. 
106 Martin Krygier, Philip Selznick: Ideals in the World (Stanford, Stanford Law Books, 2012) 
108. 
107 Philip Selznick, ‘Review of The Morality of Law’ (1965) 30 Am Soc Rev 947, 947. 
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This chapter participates in a genre of constitutional reflection that 
is inspired by a similar sociological instinct. It is a genre that seeks to hold 
our constitutional practices, theories, and common sense to the discipline 
of actually accounting for the social world with which constitutions 
interact. James Tully does this, turning his eyes to the global south and the 
lived experiences of imperialism and colonialism, arguing for new ways 
of theorizing and practicing constitutionalism.108 Similarly, John Borrows 
expertly draws out the ‘needs, strivings, and particular circumstances’ of 
Indigenous peoples to point to the inadequacy of prevailing constitutional 
theories and practices, and to urge a new understanding and orientation 
to our constitutional lives.109 
 This chapter has sought to do something of the same character, 
asking what we learn when we marshal what we know about the 
complexity and untidiness of the role of religion in modern society and 
bring that knowledge to bear on the enterprise of liberal constitutionalism 





                                                 
108 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995); James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: 
Volume 1, Democracy and Civic Freedom (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 2, Imperialism and Civic Freedom 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
109 Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution; John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s 
Guide (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
